finalisis of the events leading up to the
November Uprising and its aftermath at the Athens
Politeohnic in 1973

presented at the meeting of the Association of Greek Students
of the University of Western Ontario, Sunday, November 15, 1981.

George Panadatos
Scarborough College,

University of Toronto.

 

Ladies, gentlemen, friends, good afternoon.

Before progressing to today's subject I would like to
thank the Greek Student Association of the University of Western 3
Ontario for its kind invitation, which makes it possible for all
of 'us to be together here to celebrate the eighth anniversary of
the Athens Polytechnic. My thanks, too, to the Association's Pre—
sident, Mr. George , for entrusting me with the complex
task of analysing the events of the November uprising. I hOpe my

efforts will redeem that trust.

Since forty minutes is pretty scant time for anyone to give
a detailed and comprehensive picture of the events in question, I
shall limit my comments to three areas of concern:
(1) The causes behind the foreign—controlled seizure of power by
the junta in April 1967;
(2) The Greek people's resistance to Papadopoulos' régime and its
culmination in the stand at the Athens Polytechnical Institute;
(3) Generally speaking, the historical and political significance

of the November uprising.

The establishment of a military dictatorship in April I967
abruptly ended the deadlock which dependency politics had brought
to a head. The junta's aim was a clear one: to make any sacrifices
needed to prevent the anticipated victory of the combined progressive
' and democratic forces in the planned May 1967 elections. It likewise

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wished to buy time in order to better consolidate in Greece the neces—

sary conditions for a pre—existing NATO solution designed to deliver

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political stability to the leaders of the extreme reactionary block
who, it was planned, would act under strict military supervision.
We may discern five reasons for the coup and the path sub—
sequently taken by its leaders:
(1) The unyielding Opposition on the one hand of the Centre Union
Party, and on the other hand, of the massive and often confrontational
p0pular movement, strained and at times even threatened the royalist
nature of the political system;
(2) The palace and the political remnants of the extreme right that
supported it unchecked behing the scenes, were politically bankrupt;
it was thus impossible for them to offer any firm guarantees of stability
to both local and foreign capital, given the extent of popular Opposition;
(3) Arrangements were under way to soften the military's image with
token civilian leaders, a necessary step if exploitation of Greece by
mononolies was to become a formal and practical reality;
(4) A high degree of tension in the Middle East, the necessary pro—
logue to Israeli expansionary moves, was.only one element of the many—
pronged imperialistic plan to increase and secure military, economic
and political strength in the Middle East; the area's Sensitivity
made it imperative to secure an American~used naval base in Crete.
(5) Greek military awareness that the implementation of NATO plans
for the partition of Cyprus into Greek and Turkish enclaves would give
America a permanent presence in the Mediterranean. %
These cogent reasons seriously contradict the widespread if
simplistic assertions of a certain Greek pdlitical class who, for
the sake of its own sUrvival, painted the picture of a small, inde—
pendent officers' group enthusiastically moving on its own to save

the country from irreversible chaos. They also show us why, on April

 

21 1967, democracy disappeared, usurped by the army as the first and
only player on the country's political scene. The player then pro-
ceeded to install itself as bodyguard and defender of the "existing
political and social order against internal and external enemies".‘
This violent overthrow of a democratic system of government was,
however, condemned in the conscience of the people from the first
day. How else are we to explain the junta's failure to create even
the most rudimentary base of pOpular support to aid them in camouflaging
their national fraud? The general outcry and condemnation was such
that soon the junta's chief tools of government became police terror
and brutal violence. These measures unquestionably marked the nature
of every effort on the colonels' part to "normalize" and ”soften" the
image of the ruthless military domination forced upon the people of
Greece for the next seven years.

At the same time the dictatorship, as part of its programme
to disarm the populace by shifting the focus of its interests, threw

. Greece open to all comers by seeking and encouraging long—term, low-
interest investment in such areas as tourism, consumer goods and im—
port development, and by fostering an unprecedented — and unregulated -
boom in the construction.industry. In this way a number of financial
sellouts were concluded with obliging multinational corporations. At
the end of 1970, to counter growing fears both at home and abroad,

,the junta created a puppet body which answered to the name of an
"Advisory Council", and gave it the task of alleviating the economic
Crisis which threatened the Public Treasury with bankruptcy. But by
.1972 the economic noose was steadily growing tighter in reaction not
only to the military's hasty national policies but in particular to
the very real stagflation that marked capitalistic countries internatio—
nally.ifiot surprisingly, the immediate consequences of this situation .

JWere rising unemployment, the freezing of incomes and a sudden surge

 

in the cost of living index — all of which led to a financial squeeze
on working people. So_it was that the junta could not provide a satis—
factory solution to the just demands of blue and white collar workers;
even if it had wished to, it would have found its wav blocked because
it clashed with the monOpolistic interes s the junta served in the
first place. Faced with the disagreeable prospect of chain reactions
in the ponulace, the dictatorship was forced to announce a series of
spectacular palliatives in an attempt to calm citizens' frustrations
by raising their h0pes.

In an attempt to break out of its internal isolation, it
tried to exploit for its own ends the people's well—established
aversion to the monarchy, and seized the same Opportunity to announce
its next step, aimed at softening the image of brute force it had
acquired until now. Accordingly, a mock referendum was engineered;

it secured the Presidency for the post's sole candidate, Papadopoulos.

It must here be stressed that this set of manoeuvres was
the result of Pentagon and NATO planning that called initially for _
the loyal support of Panadopoulos, and when his ouster became politically
expedient, for his replacement by a group of civilian politicians from
the conservative ranks, led by Emmanuel Averof. This pre-arranged
course of action, which we may term "dictatorial normalization", had
the unexpected merit of awakening from lethargic slumber a number of
former members of Parliament, ministers and other figures, who hame
together under the Prime Ministership of Spiros Marchezinis to burnish
the junta's laughable civilian image. Obedient executors of the military's

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.commands, they believed their turn had come to rule the Greek people
without giving it the right to decide its own future. The stubborn
intractability of the people, however, and public denunciation of

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this handful of opportunists on the part of the leaders of the progresé

 

sive parties, illustrated beyond a doubt the resounding failure of
the junta's so—called normalization programme.g

Let us now look at what resistance the Greek people offered
Ito the imposition of dictatorship.

The speed and ease with which the junta imposed itself coincide
historically with the loose organization and lack of preparation of
the pooular element. Once again the popular movement, despite its
broad base and its sense of identity, paid a high price for its weak—
nesses. In order, however, to better comprehand these weakness s, we
shall now turn to examine the degree of political awareness of the

parties that can be said to have played a key role in Greece prior
to 1967.

The personality of George Papandreou was instrumental in en~
larging the Centre Union Party. I don't think anyone will disagree with
me if we say that the majority of the‘democratic forces had placed its
hopes and dreams for political change in an unyielding struggle which
which had often brought the conservative right toeteeth—gritting frustra—
tion. The heteroclite electoral coalition of the Centre Union, stoutly
maintaining its belief in the numerical superiority of votes, naturally
did not suspect the possibility of.a dictatorship, and was prematurely
celebrating the all-out victory indicated for May of 1967.

l The United Democratic Front, as a leftist party, though compara—
tively sharp politically and armed ideologically, had been trapped in
theoretical discussions up until the last day; and indeed, when the

colonels began making arrests, was still engaged in proving — on the

.basis of the Well—known twelve points it published in its official

newspaper, Avghi ~ the reasons for which a military putsch would never

succeed in Greece. The National Progressive Party on the other hand,

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.‘ a if '1 I , J ’1‘, ‘1 ,

 

the faithful voice of the Greek establishment, was not overly concerned
about the possibility of a dictatorship, for the simple reason that it
stood to lose nothing, and probably gain something. It already knew it
would lose the elections, and in the final analysis considered that a
military takeover would at least represent its own interests, for it
would surely be Royalist—inspired.

With such a backdron in mind, we should now be able to understand
why the Greek people were so caught by "surprise" when the colonels
seized power. In brief, the growth of ponular resistance went through
the following phases:

(1) Astonishment, then passivity on the part of the majority during

the first months of the dictatorship;

(2)“ The formation of various resistance organizations, some named, some
not, and the development of very considerable anti—junta activity.

(3) The appearance of the first pOpular demonstrations whenever a con—
crete political opportunity afforded itself, for instance, the funerals
of George Papandreou and George Seferis;

(4) The organization of public rallies, chiefly under the impetus of
the students. I'm referring, for example, to the protest organized by
six hundred students in April of 1972 in front of the University of Athens,
or the assembly of two hundred students in front of the City Hall on
May the first of the same year. i

(5) Isolated acts of destruction or vandalism (involving, for instance,
fire—setting or homemade bombs), directed against American influence in

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Greece, and aimed at symbolic objects such as cars or statues. \

(6) The abortive attempt of Alexander Panagoulis to assassinate the dicta-
tor, Pafiadopoulos.

(7) The co—ordination of resistance efforts between the students and the

populace at large, such as the remarkable turnout the people of Athens

gave the3students' sit—in at the Law School of the University of Athens

5

 

in mid—February of 1973.

(8) The development of the struggle, after the spring of 1973, and_
its subsequent spread both to the city workplace and to some agricul—
tural areas. Such phenomena bluntly indicate how unions and political
groups alike had begun to mould them elves into a coherent form at
the grassroOts level, laying, by their very nature, the foundations
for the establishment of a co-ordinated struggle against the fascist
dictators and their empire~building protectors.

The culmination of that struggle was,unquestionably, the
popular uprising of November that began with the students' occupation
of the Athens Polytechnic.

At this junction, I will simply give the floor to a survivor
of the uprising, Yannis Zafiropoulos, and read you his dexcription of

the events of the resistance inside the Polytechnic School.

(there follows a\Greek text that chronologically
recounts the actual events of the three-day uprising)

Friends, all of you who are gathered here today:

Eight years have passed since-that November in 1973. I don't
feel I am the one to give you an appreciation of the meaning of‘the
heroic events of the Polytechnic. That appreciationfwas exuressed in
no uncertain terms by the Greek people on‘the 18th of October, 1981.

i The overwhelming victory of the democratic forces of our country_in
the recent-elections is, for me, the result of the sacrifice of our
brothers who chose to resist inside the Polytechnic. It is the continu-

ationfof the aims that the youth of Greece set fer itself at the cost

;,of much blood. It is also the proof that our people have not forgotten

their dead, but have fought for eight years to banish the conservative

 

right from the political arena for once and always. The impressive

electoral victory of the Panhellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) is the
victory of all progressive forces as well. It opens a new chapter
in the history of our country: the chapter of democratic change.
The new government of Greece, though only several weeks old, has
finally showed us the practical meaning of change.

It has officially proclaimed the epic place of the National

Resistance in modern Greek history, and recognizes on the day after
tomorrow, Tuesday, for the first time, the popular Hovember uprising

with its own participation and the declaration of a national holiday

to commemorate the Polytechnic.

It is my hope that this wind of change will eventually arrive
in North America to open the eyes of, and constitute a lesson-in patri—
otism to, some persons who irreSponsihly persist in denying the halls
of the Greek Community to student groups such as your own for the
purpose of commemorating the Polytechnic. Their behaviour defiles

the sacrifice of our youth, who gave their very lives in order to Open,

to us, the road to freedom and democracy.

Thank you.

‘

' translated by S. Mittler

t