21 1967, democracy disappeared, usurped by the army as the first and only player on the country's political scene. The player then pro- ceeded to install itself as bodyguard and defender of the "existing political and social order against internal and external enemies".‘ This violent overthrow of a democratic system of government was, however, condemned in the conscience of the people from the first day. How else are we to explain the junta's failure to create even the most rudimentary base of pOpular support to aid them in camouflaging their national fraud? The general outcry and condemnation was such that soon the junta's chief tools of government became police terror and brutal violence. These measures unquestionably marked the nature of every effort on the colonels' part to "normalize" and ”soften" the image of the ruthless military domination forced upon the people of Greece for the next seven years.

At the same time the dictatorship, as part of its programme to disarm the populace by shifting the focus of its interests, threw

. Greece open to all comers by seeking and encouraging long—term, low- interest investment in such areas as tourism, consumer goods and im— port development, and by fostering an unprecedented — and unregulated - boom in the construction.industry. In this way a number of financial sellouts were concluded with obliging multinational corporations. At the end of 1970, to counter growing fears both at home and abroad,

,the junta created a puppet body which answered to the name of an "Advisory Council", and gave it the task of alleviating the economic Crisis which threatened the Public Treasury with bankruptcy. But by .1972 the economic noose was steadily growing tighter in reaction not only to the military's hasty national policies but in particular to the very real stagflation that marked capitalistic countries internatio— nally.ifiot surprisingly, the immediate consequences of this situation .

JWere rising unemployment, the freezing of incomes and a sudden surge